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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY

J.

WICKES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

STATE FARM MUTIJAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12598

Brief in Opposition to Appellant's
Petition and Brief for Rehearing

ARGUMENT
THE COURT MADE NO MATERIAL ERROR
ON EITHER THE FACTS OR LAW IN ITS
OPINION ON POINT III AND AS CLAIMED
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
Appellant in her brief claims by Point III that the acceptance of the premium by the defendant insurance company
after notice of the loss constituted a waiver of the timely
payment of the premium and thereby claims that coverage
existed for the death of Mr. Homer Wickes.
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In ruling on this Point III, the court in its opinion stated
as follows:
"The third claim of error is that the trial court

sh?uld have ruled that by the acceptance of the pre-

mmm by the defendant after notice of loss it waived
the provision of timely payment.
The premium was not paid within ten days after
lapse of the policy; hence the policy by its terms was
not effective until the date when the premium was
received by the defendant. The 40-day provision of
the policy governs here, and the policy only became
effective August 18, 1969, at which time the plaintiff
and her daughter were the named insureds. The deceased husband was not intended by either plaintiff
or defendant to be covered by the new policy and, of
course, plaintiff cannot recover under the new policy
for his death.
It is to be regretted that a $10,000 policy was
not reinstated by the simple expedient of paying a
$48 premium within the 10-day period following
termination of the policy. The trial judge, however,
was under a duty to enforce the policy according to
its terms, not to make new terms in order to relieve
the plaintiff from a default."

This is a sensible, concise ruling on the issue involved
in Point III. In effect, the court states that it is regrettable
that the premium was not paid when it should have been,
but since it was not paid as provided for by the policy, it was
the trial court's duty to enforce the contract as written.
Appellant quibbles with a minor error in the factual
recitation of this part of the court's opinion which has no
real bearing on the merits. The court does say that the 10-day
and 40-day notice provisions are actual terms of the policy.
2

Respondent, State Farm, concedes that these are two separate
notices which are sent to the insured and that they are not
part of the policy itself. However, this misstatement on the
part of the court is of no materiality since the court points
out correctly that the policy only became effective August
18, 1969 and that "the deceased husband was not intended
by either plaintiff or defendant to be covered by the new policy
and, of course, plaintiff cannot recover under the new policy
for his death."
Appellant seems to expect some magical significance to
follow if the court adopts her position that the 10-day and
40-day notices sent by respondent, State Farm, were not part
of the policy and argues that this "is the very heart" of appellant's argument. The respondent conceded in its original
brief and concedes here that they are not part of the policy
and, hopefully, this should end any further argument on that
matter. However, this has nothing to do with what the outcome of this case should be.
Appellant has conceded, as she must, that the policy expired on August 1, 1969 and before Homer Wickes' death
on August 2, 1969, so this ends any right of appellant to recover based on the policy itself. Appellant must also concede
that whereas State Farm through its 10-day notice and as
supplemented by the oral message of Agent Starbuck (who
urged that the premium be paid within the 10 days) was
willing, in effect, to waive the August 1st expiration date if
the premium was paid within the 10 days, that such was never
done and that therefore appellant cannot possibly rely on
the offer contained in the 10-day notice provision. This brings
us to what appellant must claim if she is to succeed, this being
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that State Farm somehow waived something after this 10-day
period by accepting a premium from Mrs. Wickes on August
18, 1969 and issuing to her a new policy that same day. Appellant never explains how State Farm's giving Mrs. Wickes
the very thing she testified she wanted constitutes a waiver of
its right to receive a timely premium on the old policy and
prior to its expiration date. Just what Mrs. Wickes testified
she wanted is set out, with excerpts from her testimony, in
respondent's original brief (see particularly pages 26 through
28 of said original brief) and therefore will not be repeated
here. In essence, what she testified she wanted when she
mailed in her premium was to have immediate coverage on
the Oldsmobile she was then driving in Arizona so she would
not be "uncovered at any time" (Betty Wickes' deposition,
page 22) , and she also wanted the new policy issued in her
own name. Her testimony is positive that she did not want
to be driving this car around in Arizona without insurance.
State Farm did exactly what she wanted and issued the new
policy to her with the coverages she had asked for. Just how
these facts make out a waiver or a "voluntary relinquishment
of a known right," by State Farm, as would be necessary to
establish a waiver, has never been explained by appellant.
All that State Farm did after the original policy of Mr. Wickes
expired was to try through its 10-day notice and by its agent's
oral plea to get the premium paid within the 10 days and
without any lapse in coverage. This having failed, it accepted
Mrs. Wickes' premium and gave her the coverages and policy
she demanded starting with the day it got her premium. To
say that State Farm waived something under the old pclicy
that had expired by doing this is simply unsupported by logic
or reason.
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Appellant in her brief in support of its petition for rehearing cites four cases which are claimed to support its waiver
argument. These are: Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company of California, 114 P. 134, 38 Utah 532 (1911);
Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 64 P. 2d 351,
91 Utah 405 (1937); Parker v. California State Life Insurance Company, 40 P. 2d 175, 85 Utah 595 ( 1935) and
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance Company, 232 P. 2d
754, 120 Utah 109 (1951). The problem with these cases
is that none are in point under the facts of the instant case
and this becomes readily apparent upon a reading of them.
Respondent in its original brief cited its reasons for their
non-applicability (respondent's original brief, pages 31 through
39) and the court is referred to that discussion if it deems
it important. The major distinction between those cases and
the instant one is that those cases involve a situation
where an insurance carrier accepted premiums for the period
prior to and at the time of the loss under a policy that otherwise would have lapsed for non-payment of the same premiums. In the instant case, respondent, State Farm, never accepted any premium for the period August 2nd through August 17, 1969 which was the period after the old policy expired and before the new one was issued. Had State Farm
accepted the premium for this period, even if it had later refunded it, then we would be confronted with the possible
waiver situation involved in the cases cited in appellant's brief.
CONCLUSION
The policy expired on August 1, 1969 and prior to the
accident and loss which occurred on August 2nd. Appellant
contends that State Farm or its representatives did something
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that constituted a waiver of its right under the policy to be
paid the premium on time. The facts completely fail to support any such theory of waiver. Respondent, State Farm, did
offer the appellant the chance for continuous coverage if the
premium was paid by August 10th. Appellant failed to do
this and the premium was not received until August 18th.
On that date, State Farm issued a new policy to appellant and
immediately commenced the coverage she wanted. No premium was ever applied or charged to August 2nd or any time
before August 18th when the premium was received. The
court made a minor error in its original opinion in indicating
that the 10-day and 40-day notices were part of the policy,
but this error is immaterial since the policy had expired before any premium was paid and no waiver occurred to alter
the expiration date.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
DAVID K. WINDER
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent
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